But the most interesting aspect of Sapp's book is his analysis of the social relations in science summarized in the chapter entitled 'Patterns of power'. He argues that the successes and failures of the various areas of research within heredity were not determined by an "intrinsic logical necessity of scientific thought". And that while the "technical advantage one research program may have over its rivals in producing results ... may be enough to tip the scales in its favor" (my emphasis), success (or failure) was the outcome of a "struggle for scientific authority" that involved three factors. One is "material reality" by which I take it he means the "facts" that are discovered; the second is a competitive struggle between individuals and disciplines; and the third is the relationship between the scientific enterprise and the nature of the society in which that enterprise is going on. Sapp suggests that these social interactions were the major factors that determined success, rather than the "strength of the 'true' idea". Thus Morgan's chromosome-based analysis of genetics assumed a dominant role in the study of Hughes puts it, "clinical material bearing on the issues with which Milner's Susan had been grappling for close to two decades".
Hughes's critical approach is refreshing, although not convincing in most places. For example, when she refers to "the downright sloppiness that plagued the work of Melanie Klein", one feels that Hughes has not prepared the ground properly. In the context of Hughes's analysis, the charge simply does not hold. But more serious problems abound in her discussions of the development of Freud's instinct and structural theories.
Hughes focuses rightly on the theoretical importance of Freud's unfinished and posthumously published 'Project for a scientific psychology' (1895). But she seems oblivious to the fact that the roots of the instinct theory can be found in Freud's 'Project' (endogenous Q [uantity] is not protected by a shield against stimuli), or that it evolved through three specific stages. In the first, the sexual and self-preservative (ego) instincts were given equal weight in shaping human behaviour and experience; in the second, beginning with the paper on narcissism (Freud, 1914) , the self-preservative instincts were defined with reference to libido turning back onto the ego; in the third, the death and life instincts were posited as fundamental (1920) and Freud returned full circle to ideas that were embedded in the 'Project', especially with regard to the separation oftwo of the key psychical systems-memory and consciousness.
Hughes is certainly sensitive to the issue of the English rendering of "instinct" for the German concept Trieb versus the more preferred use of "drive" by the English-speaking purists. But in general she seems unacquainted with the current issues on the English translation of Freud, although several important papers of Ormston published in the last decade are in her bibliography. One significant item in the translation debates concerns Freud's structural hypothesis. Ornston, for example, supports the position that the so-called structural theory may in fact be James Strachey's invention, not Freud's. As Strachey is given more than adequate coverage as Freud's principal translator in the early chapters by Hughes, her unqualified assumption that Freud's structural theory is a fundamental "paradigm" of the Freudian system is a serious oversight.
Her strategy of analysing the differences between Freud's theoretical concepts and those of Klein, Fairbairn, and Winnicott is not entirely successful because she does not prepare the Freudian ground properly. On the other hand, the increasing interplay between clinical and theoretical material after the chapters on Freud and Klein sustains attention to the very end.
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More than one commentator has defended the obscurity of Hegel's philosophical writings on the grounds that the truths with which he was concerned are themselves invincibly obscure. Any book which claims to be an extension of the Hegelian programme is therefore unlikely to be an
